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Abstract
Despite the great achievements made by neural networks on
tasks such as image classification, they are brittle and vulner-
able to adversarial example (AE) attacks, which are crafted
by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to inputs in
order that a neural-network-based classifier incorrectly labels
them. In particular, L0 AEs are a category of widely discussed
threats where adversaries are restricted in the number of pix-
els that they can corrupt. However, our observation is that,
while L0 attacks modify as few pixels as possible, they tend
to cause large-amplitude perturbations to the modified pixels.
We consider this as an inherent limitation of L0 AEs, and
thwart such attacks by both detecting and rectifying them.
The main novelty of the proposed detector is that we convert
the AE detection problem into a comparison problem by ex-
ploiting the inherent limitation of L0 attacks. More concretely,
given an image I, it is pre-processed to obtain another image
I′. A Siamese network, which is known to be effective in com-
parison, takes I and I′ as the input pair to determine whether
I is an AE. A trained Siamese network automatically and
precisely captures the discrepancies between I and I′ to detect
L0 perturbations. In addition, we show that the pre-processing
technique, inpainting, used for detection can also work as
an effective defense, which has a high probability of remov-
ing the adversarial influence of L0 perturbations. Thus, our
system, called AEPECKER, demonstrates not only high AE
detection accuracies, but also a notable capability to correct
the classification results.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed tremendous success of neural
networks in a variety of fields, such as object detection [39],
motion tracking [44], face recognition [36,45], and code anal-
ysis [26, 38, 49]. Despite these great achievements, they are
vulnerable to adversarial examples (AEs). Szegedy et al. [41]
analyze the robustness of neural networks when facing ad-
versarial attacks, and show that deep learning systems are
sensitive to small adversarial perturbations. A neural-network-
based classifier thus can be misled by AEs and generate incor-
rect classification results. Many image AE generation meth-
ods have been proposed and multiple off-the-shelf tools are
available [8, 13, 22, 34].
The adversarial perturbations in an image AE are usually
subtle in order to be human-imperceptible. To quantitatively
describe such perturbations, Lp norms are usually used to
measure the discrepancy between an original benign image
Io and its corresponding AE Ia. According to the value of p,
the mainstream AE generation algorithms can be categorized
into three families, i.e., L0, L2 and L∞ attacks. Informally, L0
measures the number of modified pixels, L2 the Euclidean
distance between the two images, and L∞ the largest mod-
ification among the pixels. Note that our work focuses on
L0 AEs, a category of attacks widely considered by previous
works [8, 27, 34, 47].
To defeat attacks based on AEs, both detection and defen-
sive techniques attract the research community’s attention.
Given an input image, the detection system outputs whether
it is an AE, so that the target neural network can reject those
adversarial inputs. A defense technique, given an AE, helps
the target neural network make correct prediction by either
rectifying the AE or fortifying the classifier itself.
Many AE detection methods [3, 24, 32] and defense tech-
niques [11, 25, 46] have been proposed. However, prior meth-
ods either are not very effective in handling L0 AEs or omit
discussing them. For example, feature squeezing [47] is capa-
ble of detecting L0 AEs. However, He et al. [17] have shown
that feature squeezers, either single or joint, are not resilient to
adaptive attacks. Previous work even argues that it is challeng-
ing to recover the correct classification of L0 AEs by input
transformation, as “it is very difficult to properly reduce the
effect of the heavy perturbation” [24].
We identify two characteristics of L0 AEs. By exploiting
the two characteristics, we build a detector based on a very
simple architecture that achieves a high detection accuracy.
Moreover, a pre-processor based on these observations can ef-
fectively rectify L0 AEs to recover the correct classifications.
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The first characteristic is that it limits the number of modi-
fied pixels, but not the amplitude of pixels. Thus, L0 attacks
tend to introduce large-amplitude perturbations, especially
for targeted attacks that aim to achieve an attacker-desired
output from a neural network. Second, as L0 attacks try to
modify as few pixels as possible, the optimization-based AE
generation process tends to result in altered pixels that scatter
in the image. In other words, those corrupted parts are mostly
small and isolated regions. Both characteristics are verified
by our experiments.
We accordingly propose a novel AE detection method. The
main novelty is that we convert the AE detection problem into
a comparison problem. Specifically, the architecture of the
detector uses a Siamese network [6], which is known to be
powerful in comparison. Given an image I, it is processed
by a pre-processor to obtain another image I′. The Siamese
network takes I and I′ as the inputs and outputs whether I
is an AE. The advantage of the design is that the Siamese
network is able to automatically and precisely capture the
discrepancies between the two inputs for AE detection.
Another advantage is that the pre-processor used for AE
detection can also work as an effective defense by removing
the influence of the adversarial perturbations. Specifically,
we propose an inpainting-based algorithm to process images,
where inpainting refers to the process of reconstructing the
lost or corrupted parts of an image. The inpainting techniques
are a fruitful sub-field in the area of digital image process-
ings [29, 40, 42], which have been widely used in practice.
As we will show in Section 4.3, inpainting is more effective
at eliminating the heavy perturbations created by L0 attacks
than previous defenses.
We implement a system AEPECKER to demonstrate the
advantages aforementioned and the weakness of L0 attacks.
The system architecture is shown in Figure 1. After inputting
an image I to a pre-processor P , we obtain another image I′.
Then, the Siamese network predicts whether I is adversarial
by taking 〈I, I′〉 as the input pair. If I is detected as an L0 AE,
then we regard I′ as a rectified image and use it to replace I
in subsequent image classification for the defense purpose.
We have evaluated our system in terms of its detection
and defense capabilities using the popular image datasets
CIFAR-10 and MNIST. Two leading L0 AE generation meth-
ods, JSMA [34] and CW-L0 [8], are both considered in the
evaluation. In the case of CIFAR-10 (we have similar results
for MNIST), the evaluation results show that (1) the detection
rate on the CW-L0 and JSMA attack is 97.1% and 99.7%
respectively, both with a low false positive rate; (2) the pro-
posed system has outstanding transferability, as a detector
trained only with JSMA AEs can detect CW-L0 AEs with
a high detection rate (99.4%), and vice versa; (3) the detec-
tion is also attack-target-model agnostic (model agnostic, for
short), since in the aforementioned experiments CW-L0 AEs
and JSMA AEs actually target different image classification
models; and (4) our defense method recovers the classifica-
Pre-processor ∥v1 − v2∥ ≤ τ Legitimate
No
I
I’
use I for image 
classification
use I’ for image 
classificationAdversarial
Yes
Figure 1: An architecture of AEPECKER. If I is detected as
an L0 AE, I′ is used for image classification as a defense.
tion accuracy from 0% (when classifying those successful
AEs) to 87.3% for CW-L0, and from 0% to 96.1% for JSMA,
and meanwhile, has a very small impact on benign images.
Moreover, in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the
Siamese network in detecting AEs, we experiment to use a
preprocessing technique, bit depth reduction, that is known
to be weak. Feature squeezing [47] used it as one of the
pre-processors and obtained an AE detection rate 4.1%. In
contrast, the Siamese network plus the weak preprocessing
technique achieves 99.6%, which demonstrates the unique
advantage of the Siamese architecture in detecting AEs.
The key contributions of our work include:
• We point out the inherent characteristics of L0 AEs,
which typically contain high-amplitude perturbations
to very few and isolated pixels, and propose to exploit
them to develop detection and defense techniques.
• We convert the L0 AE detection problem into an image
comparison problem, and propose to use a Siamese net-
work to automatically extract the subtle discrepancies of
the input pair as features for the AE detection. The de-
tector demonstrates multiple prominent strengths, such
as transferability across attacks and being attack-target-
model agnostic (so the detector keeps effective across
attack methods and target classifiers).
• We propose an effective inpainting-based defense
against L0 perturbations, which can recover the correct
classification at a high probability. To the best of our
knowledge, this defense method achieves the highest
accuracy when dealing with L0 AEs.
• Adaptive attacks that try to bypass our detection are
considered and evaluated. The evaluation results show
that our system is resilient to them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we
briefly introduce some background about L0 AE generation
methods in Section 2. Section 3 describes our system archi-
tecture and design. Then, we present the evaluation design
and results in Section 4. We also empirically evaluate the
resilience of the proposed technique under adaptive attacks
in Section 5. The related work is then reviewed in Section 6.
2
We finally discuss the limitations of our work and draw con-
clusions in Section 7 and 8, respectively.
2 Adversarial Example Generation
Adversarial examples are carefully crafted inputs intended to
fool artificial intelligence systems to output incorrect labels.
The term adversarial example can be formally defined as fol-
lowing. For a pre-trained neural network f , let x be an original
image. An adversarial example xadv is such an intentionally
designed input by attackers which can guide the model f to
make an incorrect prediction. Moreover, to hide the adversar-
ial perturbation, the generation of xadv is equivalent to solve
the following constrained optimization problem:
min
xadv
‖xadv− x‖p
s.t. y¯ = f (xadv)
y = f (x)
y 6= y¯
where y and y¯ are respectively the prediction results of feeding
x and xadv to f , and ‖ · ‖p denotes the Lp-norm.
Based on the value of p, three metrics exit, i.e., L0, L2, and
L∞, which are usually used to measure human’s perception of
visual difference Specifically, L0 measures how many pixels
are modified at the corresponding positions in the resulting
image; L2 represents the Euclidean distance between the two
images; and L∞ measures the maximum difference for all
pixels at the corresponding positions in the two images.
Depending on the manner of how y¯ misleads a pre-trained
classifier, adversarial attacks to neural networks can be cat-
egorized as either targeted or non-targeted. The aim of non-
targeted attacks is to make the image be classified as any
arbitrary class except the true one. By contrast, in targeted at-
tacks the prediction result will be misguided to a specific class
different from the correct one and desired by the attacker.
In this study, we focus on the discussion of L0 AE attacks,
where JSMA and CW-L0 are two widely used and representa-
tive L0 AE generation methods. Next, we will describe these
AE generation methods briefly.
2.1 Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
The JSMA is a targeted attack based on a greedy iterative
idea proposed by Papernot et al. [34]. It takes L0 distance
minimization as the optimization target, that is, the number
of pixels that can be updated in the original image is bounded.
To determine which pixels will be manipulated, the authors
introduce the concept of saliency map which provides an
adversarial saliency score for each pixel. One single pixel that
possesses a higher adversarial saliency score usually has more
impact on misleading the target model to predict a specific
label desired by attackers. Thus, the attacker only manipulates
those pixels that have high adversarial saliency scores in each
iterative step based on a greedy strategy. The adversarial
saliency score for each pixel is calculated as:
xadvi,t = xi,t +

0, if ∂ ft (x)∂xi < 0 or ∑j 6=t
∂ f j(x)
∂xi
> 0
∂ ft (x)
∂xi
| ∑
j 6=t
∂ f j(x)
∂xi
|, otherwise
where i denotes the ith pixel in the image, and f j is the pre-
diction value of the neuron j in the target model’s output
layer.
2.2 Carlini & Wagner Attack (CW)
CWs are a group of targeted AE generation methods devel-
oped by Carlini and Wagner [8]. There are three types of
CW attacks that use distance metrics L0-, L2- and L∞-norm,
respectively. In this work, we focus on the first type of CW
attacks, where L0-norm is used as the distance metric during
the construction of AEs. In the following presentation, We
refer to such a CW attack as CW-L0.
Some notable features are developed by the authors which
make CW attacks very effective. First, to compute the loss
in gradient descent, the algorithm does not directly use final
prediction given by the target model; instead, a logit function
is used which plays a key role in the resilience improvement
of the attack against defensive distillation [35]. Second, this
algorithm maps the target variable to a space of the inverse
trigonometric function; as a result, the optimization prob-
lem is suitable to be computed by a modern solver such as
Adam [20]. Finally, a particular constant is designed to adjust
the relative importance between perturbations and the mis-
classification; through this, a fine-grained trade-off is enabled.
These techniques ensure that the CW method can generate
superior adversarial examples with minimized perturbations.
3 System Design
The proposed system consists of a Siamese network (Sec-
tion 3.2) which determines whether an input image is an L0
AE, and a pre-processor (Section 3.1) which also can be used
as a defense component to correct the classification under the
existence of L0 AEs. Note that the pre-processor has a very
small impact on benign images; thus it can be used as a de-
fense component independently without relying on detection.
3.1 Pre-processor
The pre-processor adopted in our system is designed to reduce
adversarial noises while preserving the features in images to
reduce false positives. From this perspective, the proposed
pre-processor can also be deployed as a defense against L0
attacks.
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Figure 2: Defense based on inpainting. The first and third
rows show the CW-L0 and JSMA attack applied to CIFAR-10
images, respectively. The second and fourth rows show the
corresponding resulting images after inpainting.
Intuitively, failing to limit the amplitude of those altered
pixels in the images will result in outlier pixels. Previous
work [24] emphasizes that it is challenging to get rid of the
effect of those heavy perturbations. However, we argue the
outlier pixels can be fixed by applying a processor based on
inpainting. In image processing, the term “inpainting” refers
to the process of reconstructing lost or corrupted regions of
image data (or to remove small defects). Our idea is to treat
those outliers as small corrupted regions, and the inpainting
technique exactly meets the need for eliminating the L0 noise.
In detail, we observe that those L0 perturbations manifest
themselves visually as salient noises. A mask to determine
which pixels should be reconstructed can help identify these
cases. When inspecting the pixel intensity in different color
channels (e.g., the R, G, B channels for color images), for an
altered pixel, it is highly possible that one extreme value can
be observed in at least one channel. For example, an original
pixel is represented as an intensity vector [0.32, 0.56, 0.62],
where all the values are normalized. After corrupting by the L0
attack, it becomes [0.33, 0.55, 0.96], whose B channel has an
extreme value 0.96. We define a value as extreme if it is either
smaller than an upper bound α or larger than an lower bound β.
Thus, to obtain such a mask, we first locate all pixels of which
the intensity are exceptional at least one channel. Meanwhile,
we noticed that such pixels that achieve extreme values in all
of the three channels are often the bright parts such as the
sky in a natural image. Therefore, we use a parameter γ to
help filter out such pixels in color images. According to our
observation, we choose γ= 0.7 as an empirical value. Lines
4-10 in Algorithm 1 show the procedures to initially create
the mask.
In addition, considering that the number of altered pixels
only occupies a small portion of the image, the possibility
that most of the altered pixels will assemble to form a con-
nected region is very low. Consequently, to further exclude
Algorithm 1: The Pre-processor based on Inpainting.
Input: A color image I ;
two bounds α and β used to find extreme values;
a parameter γ to describe bright pixels in natural images;
a structuring element E of the specified size and shape.
Output: A processed color image, denoted by S .
1 Normalize I ← [min(I )− I ]/[min(I )−max(I )];
2 Extract three channels (IR, IG, IB) from I ;
3 Initialize the masks M R,M G,M B←{0};
4 for each pixel Ii ∈ I , do
5 if (IRi < α)∨ [(IRi > β)∧ (IGi ≤ γ ∨ IBi ≤ γ)] then
6 M Ri ← 1;
7 if (IGi < α)∨ [(IGi > β)∧ (IRi ≤ γ ∨ IBi ≤ γ)] then
8 M Gi ← 1;
9 if (IBi < α)∨ [(IBi > β)∧ (IGi ≤ γ ∨ IRi ≤ γ)] then
10 M Bi ← 1;
11 for each pixel M χi ∈M χ,where χ := R,G,B, do
12 if ∃ N(M χi )> E , s.t.M χj = 1 ∧ M χj ∈ N(M χi ) then
13 M χj ← 0;
14 for each I χ := IR,IG,IB, do
15 Sχ←Inpainting I χ according to M χ;
16 Reconstruct S with SR, SG and SB;
17 return S .
those unlikely candidates, we will remove those relatively
large connected regions from the mask. Specifically, we use
a structuring element E to describe a connected region with
the specified size and shape. If a connected region is larger
than E , we will exclude such region from the mask, as Lines
11-13 in Algorithm 1 show, where N(·) denotes a connected
neighborhood.
We thus independently produce an inpainting mask for
each channel of a color image. We then take advantage of the
inpainting method proposed in [42] to restore those deterio-
rated pixels for each channel, as Lines 14-15 in Algorithm 1
show. Figure 2 displays some concrete examples applying Al-
gorithm 1 with α= 0.2, β= 0.8 on CIFAR-10. The resultant
images in the even numbered row show that the adversar-
ial perturbations are almost completely eliminated. We will
provide more detailed experimental results to demonstrate
how our defense influences the effectiveness of L0 attacks in
Section 4.
The algorithm for gray images is very similar to Algo-
rithm 1, but we only need to consider one channel rather than
three. Thus, we can consider the algorithm for gray images
as a special case of the algorithm for color images.
Parameters selection. At beginning, our algorithm normal-
izes the value of all input pixels, such that their values are
in the range of [0,1]. (1) α is the upper bound of extremely
small values; thus, the value of α should be small (e.g. less
4
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Figure 3: The architecture of a Siamese network which is
used as our AE detector.
than 0.2). (2) β is the lower bound of extremely large values;
thus, it should be relatively large (e.g. 0.7 at least). Different
parameters settings slightly affect the effectiveness of recti-
fying AEs. We show the experiment results in Section 4.3.
(3) In addition, as aforementioned, we use a parameter, γ, to
help filter out the normal bright parts in a natural image. The
term atmospheric light refers to those pixels, which has been
discussed in detailed in the field of image processing [19].
Based on our experience, in our experiment (Section 4), the
value of γ is set to 0.7. (4) Finally, the structuring element E
is closely related to the restoration capability of the inpainting
algorithm and the size of input images. The corrupted region
that can be restored by the widely used inpainting algorithms
is not only a single pixel but also a small patch [29, 40, 42].
However, as the size of patch increases, the restoration effect
usually degrades. A recommendation size of E given by [42]
ranges from three to ten pixels. Note that the performance
of the pre-processor has little impact on the detection accu-
racy of AEPECKER, as demonstrated in our evaluation (see
Section 4.4.3).
3.2 Siamese Network-Based Detector
As a classic category of neural network architecture, Siamese
networks [6] are widely applied among those tasks that in-
volve detecting similarities or other relationships between two
or more comparable thingss [49]. In general, a Siamese net-
work consists of two sub-networks which share one identical
architecture with the same weights.
Given an input image I, when pre-processing is adopted,
the input image I and the pre-processed one I′ may be very
different even if I is benign. On the other hand, the discrep-
ancy between the two images, I and I′, may not be simply
described using a single value and compared with a threshold,
as adopted by feature squeezing [47]. These are the main
loss function
{Io}
Y = 0Y = 1
Embedding 
Vector 
Embedding 
Vector 
Sub-Network 
Sub-Network 
I’a
I a}
{
{
} ’o{I }
Figure 4: Training phrase of the AE detector based on a
Siamese network.
challenges in devising an accurate detection technique.
We propose a Siamese-based L0 AE detector with the help
of a pre-processor, which converts the AE detection problem
into an image comparison problem. Once the model with fine
tuned weights is established (via training), the discrepancy
between I and I′ can be extracted by the Siamese network.
Taking the discrepancies as features, the model can predict
whether the input image is adversarial or not.
Figure 3 illustrates the architecture of our Siamese network-
based AE detector. In particular, we learn from the classical
AlexNet [21] to design our CNN-based sub-networks but only
use a shallow network. The purpose is to explore how well
the AE detector performs even when it only uses a simple
network design. The details of the sub-network employed by
each twin in the Siamese network are as follows:
CNN : → conv(3×3,64)→ ReLU
→ conv(3×3,64)→ ReLU
→ maxpool(2×2)→ dropout(0.3)
→ Flatten
→ linear(__,128)→ ReLU → dropout(0.5)
→ linear(128,10)→ so f tmax.
Figure 4 elaborates the training phrase of the proposed de-
tector based on a Siamese network. Given an image I and its
pre-processed version I′, the Siamese network takes 〈I, I′〉 as
inputs, where the label is 0 if I is not an AE (denoted as Io), or
1 if I is an AE (denoted as Ia). Although it is difficult to use
a formula to describe the discrepancy between the input pair
〈Ia, I′a〉 and the consistency between 〈Io, I′o〉, the Siamese net-
work is effective in learning such relationship. Moreover, the
consistency and discrepancy can be learned even when a non-
powerful pre-processor is adopted, such as a bit depth reducer
(see Section 4.4.3). The result of the last layer of each of the
two sub-networks is fed to a contrastive loss function [15]:
(1−Y )1
2
(DW )2+(Y )
1
2
{(max(0,m−DW )}2
where DW is defined as the Euclidean distance between the
outputs of the two sub-networks, Y is a binary label assigned
to the input pair, and m > 0 is a margin used to define a radius
around the output of one of the sub-networks. Finally, once
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the model is successfully trained, the Siamese network can
be used to determine whether I is an AE.
Our evaluation shows that, even with a relatively small
training dataset and a network with very few layers, our de-
tector can still achieve a very high accuracy.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our system on its detection and
defense capability. We first describe the experimental settings
and implementation (Section 4.1) and discuss the datasets
used in our evaluation (Section 4.2). We then evaluate the
effect of our pre-processing method as a defense alone (Sec-
tion 4.3). Next we evaluate the accuracy of our system on
detecting AEs generated by JSMA and CW-L0 (Section 4.4),
and the efficiency in terms of training and testing (Section 4.5).
The resilience of our system against an adaptive attack is pre-
sented in Section 5.
It is worth noting that our proposed method can not only
detect adversarial examples but also rectify the classification
results. Thus, Section 4.3 shows that our pre-processor as a
defense can individually and functionally rectify the classi-
fication results of L0 AEs. Section 4.4 demonstrates that the
detector (i.e., pre-processor plus the Siamese architecture) can
distinguish AEs from benign images.
4.1 Experimental Settings
Threat model. We assume attackers have full knowledge
on a trained target image classification model, but no ability
to influence that model. Thus, given a trained target model,
attackers can use the L0 attacks including JSMA and CW-L0
to generate AEs that will be misclassified by the target model.
Target models. We use two popular datasets for the image
classification task: MNIST and CIFAR-10. For each dataset,
we build up two individual models for the two types of L0
attacks. Specifically, for MNIST, we set up a CNN-based
classifier [18] for JSMA, and reuse the model structure pro-
vided in [8]—which we denote as CarliniM—for CW-L0. For
CIFAR-10, we select the 32-layered ResNet model based on
a residual learning framework [16] for JSMA, and reuse the
model structure given in [8]—which we denote as CarliniC—
for CW-L0. All the target models are trained from scratch.
Table 1 summarizes the classification accuracy on the test-
ing data of each model. The accuracy of CarliniM and the
CNN target model for MNIST is 99.26% and 99.52%, respec-
tively; and the accuracy of CarliniC and the ResNet model
for CIFAR-10 is 78.86% and 91.96%, respectively. Note that
only those images which can be correctly classified by the
corresponding target models are used to generate AEs in the
following experiments.
Attacks. For the target models CarliniM and CarliniC, we
reuse the code provided in [8] to generate CW-L0 AEs. The
Dataset Target Model Accuracy
MNIST
CarliniM [8] 99.26%
CNN [18] 99.52%
CIFAR-10
CarliniC [8] 78.86%
ResNet [16] 91.96%
Table 1: Classification accuracy of the target models.
default parameters settings suggested by Carlini and Wag-
ner [8] are as follows: the number of maximum iterations is
1000, the initial constant is 0.001, and the largest constant is 26.
To compare with the state-of-the-art works [27,47], we follow
these parameters settings. Furthermore, for the target CNN
and ResNet model, we generate AEs with JSMA by leverag-
ing the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) [33]. We used
the same parameters settings as [27, 47], i.e., θ= 1,γ= 0.1.
As both JSMA and CW-L0 are targeted attacks, we designate
the next class as the target class.
Table 2 reports the results of the AEs. The success rate
is defined as the probability that an adversary achieves their
goal. For a targeted attack, it is only considered a success if
the model predicts the target class. Note that we only use the
AEs that can successfully attack the target models to evaluate
the performance of our system on detecting AEs.
Implementation. We implement our Siamese-based detector
in Python using the Keras [9] platform with TensorFlow [1] as
backend. Keras provides a large number of high-level neural
network APIs and can run on top of TensorFlow. The Telea’s
inpainting algorithm [42] is implemented based on Open
Source Computer Vision Library (OpenCV) [5].
The experiments were performed on a computer running
the Ubuntu 18.04 operating system with a 64-bit 3.6 GHz
Intel R© Core(TM) i7 CPU, 16 GB RAM and GeForce GTX
1070 GPU.
4.2 Data Preparation
We generate AEs based on two image datasets, i.e., CIFAR-10
and MNIST.
CIFAR-10 contains 60,000 color images; each is assigned
to one of ten different classes, such as dog, frog and ship.
CIFAR-10 is split into the training and testing dataset, which
contains 50,000 and 10,000 images, respectively.
We first filter out those images that cannot be correctly
classified by the corresponding target model. We then use
the CW-L0 algorithm to generate AEs that can success-
fully attack the CarliniC model [8], and create two dis-joint
datasets, denoted as DC-CWL0-Train and DC-CWL0-Test.
In detail,DC-CWL0-Train contains 10,000 legitimate images
and 10,000 AEs. DC-CWL0-Test contains 1,000 benign im-
ages and 1,000 AEs. Next, we follow the similar method on
CIFAR-10 but instead using JSMA to generate AEs based on
ResNet classifier [16]. As a result, we obtain two dis-joint
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Dataset Attack Success rate
MNIST
CW-L0 [8] 100%
JSMA [34] 81.6%
CIFAR-10
CW-L0 [8] 100%
JSMA [34] 99.8%
Table 2: Evaluation of the L0 attacks
β
α
0.0 0.1 0.2
0.6 81.3% 86.9% 84.2%
0.7 80.5% 87.3% 86.5%
0.8 76.0% 86.2% 86.5%
Table 3: The classification accuracy
on AEs in DC-CWL0 -Test after using
inpainting-based pre-processors.
β
α
0.0 0.1 0.2
0.6 90.0% 81.2% 63.2%
0.7 94.1% 88.8% 74.5%
0.8 96.1% 91.2% 77.3%
Table 4: The classification accuracy
on AEs in DC-JSMA -Test after using
inpainting-based pre-processors.
Loss ratio 60% 40% 20%
JSMA 27.4% 17.9% 5.4%
CW-L0 44.5% 35.1% 21.4%
Table 5: The classification accuracy on test-
ing datasets after applying SVD compression.
Dataset Attack Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score FPR
CIFAR-10
JSMA 99.85% 100.0% 99.70% 99.85% 0.0%
CW-L0 95.80% 94.64% 97.10% 95.85% 5.5%
MNIST
JSMA 99.80% 99.90% 99.70% 99.80% 0.1%
CW-L0 99.40% 99.30% 99.50% 99.40% 0.7%
Table 6: The detection performance of the proposed system.
datasets, denoted as DC-JSMA-Train and DC-JSMA-Test.
There are 10,000 legitimate images and 10,000 AEs in train-
ing set. There are 1,000 legitimate images and 1,000 AEs in
testing set.
MNIST contains 70,000 8-bit grayscale images of hand-
written digits. Each image is assigned a label from 0 to 9.
MNIST is split into the training and testing dataset, which
contains 60,000 and 10,000 images, respectively. We carry
out similar procedures on MNIST to create a training and test-
ing set but using different target models. As a result, we have
DM -CWL0-Train and DM -CWL0-Test based on CarliniM
model [8], as well asDM -JSMA-Train andDM -JSMA-Test
based on CNN [18] model. The sizes of these datasets are
the same as their counterparts in CIFAR-10. Considering
that CIFAR-10 is a more challenging dataset compared with
MNIST, we will spend more space on explaining the results
for CIFAR-10 in the following experiments.
Note that all the aforementioned legitimate images can be
classified correctly by the target model, and all the AEs can
successfully fool the corresponding target model.
4.3 Effectiveness of Pre-processor as Defense
To mislead a classifier to predict a specific target class, the
adversarial perturbations produced by an L0 attack such as
JSMA or CW-L0 are introduced intentionally instead of ran-
domly. Moreover, the adversarial strength of an L0 attack
limits the number of pixels that can be manipulated; and as a
result, the manipulated pixels need to have significant changes.
The proposed inpainting-based pre-processor is to eliminate
the possible adversarial pixels while preserving the benign
ones. Therefore, the inpainting-based pre-processor can also
be considered as a defense against L0 attacks.
Inpainting-based pre-processor for color images. We
first evaluate the effectiveness of the inpainting-based pre-
processor as a defense against L0 attack on CIFAR-10. The
inpainting-based algorithm has two parameters: the threshold
α extracts the pixels whose values tend to be very small, and β
is used to screen all pixels whose values tend to be extremely
large. We use 1,000 AEs inDC-CWL0-Test to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the inpainting-based pre-processor as a defense
against CW-L0 attacks and examine its performance with
varying values of α and β. Without pre-processing, these AEs
result in 0% classification accuracy when using the CarliniC
model [8]. After pre-processing, each recovered AE is ana-
lyzed by the model to predict a class label. Table 3 shows the
results. When α = 0.1 and β = 0.7, the performance is the
best—the classification accuracy on these AEs is increased
from 0% to 87.3%.
We then use 1,000 AEs in DC-JSMA-Test to evaluate
the effectiveness of the inpainting-based pre-processor as
a defense against JSMA attack. Without pre-processing,
these AEs result in 0% classification accuracy of the ResNet
model [16]. After applying inpainting-based pre-processor
to rectify those AEs, each recovered AE is analyzed by the
ResNet model to predict a class label. Table 4 shows the
results. We can see that when α= 0.0 and β= 0.8, the perfor-
mance is the best—the classification accuracy on these AEs
is increased from 0% to 96.1%. This classification accuracy
is higher than 87.3% given by the previous CarliniC model.
Moreover, the ResNet model is more robust against the benign
perturbations introduced by the inpainting procedure.
As a comparison, we examine the impact of both SVD com-
pression and median filter on AEs generated by L0 attacks.
First, as a low-pass filter, SVD compression is usually used to
reduce noise in images. As shown in Table 5, when varying
the loss ratio of SVD compression, the classification accuracy
on the processed AEs is very low—at most 44.5% and 27.4%
for CW-L0 AEs and JSMA AEs, respectively. Note that we
only use those images which can be correctly classified by
the target model to generate AEs; thus the maximum clas-
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sification accuracy given by the target model here is 100%.
Therefore, the experiment suggests that the perceptible per-
turbations introduced by an L0 attack are very difficult to
be reduced when only using the frequency domain filters.
Alternatively, [47] and [14] claim that median filter is particu-
larly effective in mitigating adversarial examples generated
by an L0 attack because such perturbations are very similar
to salt-and-pepper noises. In our experiments, after apply-
ing the median filter to process AEs in DC-CWL0-Test and
DC-JSMA-Test, the classification accuracy given by CarliniC
and ResNet is 79.8% and 85.3%, respectively; both are lower
than the proposed defense.
Inpainting-based pre-processor for gray images. We can
observe similar results on MNIST when taking advantage of
the inpainting-based pre-processor as a defense against an
L0 attack. Our experiment shows that processing the 1,000
AEs in DM -CWL0-Test with the proposed inpainting-based
method results in a significant increase of the classification
accuracy on the CarliniM model [8]—from 0% to 88.2%.
Similarly, after using the proposed inpainting-based method
on the 1,000 AEs in DM -JSMA-Test, the recovered AEs
result in the classification accuracy on the CNN model [18]
to increase from 0% to 86.1%. All of the results above are
obtained when α= 0.1 and β= 0.8. When varying the value
of α from 0.1 to 0.2 and the value of β from 0.7 to 0.8, the
classification accuracy increases slowly (84.9% at least).
As a comparison, Bafna et al. [2] independently focus on
the L0 attacks, and propose a defense based on Fourier trans-
form. But our approach outperforms theirs—after applying
their defense algorithm against CW-L0, their classification
accuracy on the MNIST testing set is only 72.8%. Note that
they did not conduct experiments on standard color-image
datasets such as CIFAR-10.
Impact on benign images. To investigate the impact of the
defense methods on benign images, we first carry out an ex-
periment on the 1,000 benign images from DC-JSMA-Test.
Specifically, we use the ResNet model [16] to classify each
color image after the inpainting-based defense is applied. The
classification accuracy on these processed images only de-
creases from 100% to 95.6%. Next, we conduct a similar ex-
periment on the 1,000 benign images from DM -JSMA-Test.
We use the CNN model [18] to classify each gray image af-
ter the inpainting-based defense is applied. As a result, the
classification accuracy on these processed images only de-
creases from 100% to 99.7%. The results show that a very
small impact is imposed on classifying benign images.
Summary. Therefore, the proposed inpainting-based algo-
rithm is effective in defending against L0 attacks such as
CW-L0 and JSMA. Moreover, our defense methods have a
very small impact on benign images, which implies it can be
directly applied without relying on detection.
4.4 Detecting L0 Adversarial Inputs
We next evaluate the effectiveness of our system on detecting
AEs generated by L0 attacks.
4.4.1 Detection Efficacy
We evaluate the detection performance of the proposed
scheme against CW-L0 and JSMA attack. The inpainting-
based pre-processor is used to create input pairs to the
Siamese network.
Color images. The two training datasets, DC-CWL0-Train
and DC-JSMA-Train, are used to train our system individu-
ally for 200 epochs using early stopping configured with a
minimum accuracy change of 0.001 and 50 patience steps. If
an accuracy change is less than 0.001, we consider that there
is no improvement of the model performance; after 50 epochs
with no improvement, the training is stopped. We save the
resulting models as the base models.
We now evaluate the detection accuracy of the base mod-
els against CW-L0 and JSMA attack on DC-CWL0-Test and
DC-JSMA-Test, respectively. Each dataset contains 1,000
benign images and 1,000 AEs. We plot the ROC (receiver
operating characteristic) curves, which are showed in Fig-
ure 5(a). We can achieve the AUC values of 98.69% and
99.94% for the two L0 attacks. Table 6 shows more detailed
results evaluated on the testing set.
We consider the adversarial images as positive, and the
benign images as negative. Thus, the recall value (i.e., the de-
tection rate) is the ratio of the number of successfully detected
AEs to the total number of AEs; and False Positive Rate (FPR)
is the fraction of the negative testing data (i.e., benign images)
that is misclassified as positive. In practice, the distribution of
adversarial and benign images are not balanced—most of the
images should be benign. Thus, FPR is a very important met-
ric to evaluate the model performance; a lower FPR indicates
that the system makes fewer mistakes for benign images.
As shown in Table 6, when analyzing AEs generated by the
CW-L0 attack, the detection rate of DC-CWL0-Test is 97.1%
and the FPR is 5.5%. When analyzing AEs generated by the
JSMA attack, the detection rate of DC-JSMA-Test is 99.7%
and the FPR is as low as 0.0%.
Gray images. We follow the same configurations to conduct
an experiment on MNIST. Because gray images only have
one channel, training a Siamese network on MNIST is simpler
than that on CIFAR-10. We thus only train the detector for
100 epochs using an early stopping with 30 patience steps.
We evaluate the detection accuracy of the base models
against CW-L0 and JSMA attacks on DM -CWL0-Test and
DM -JSMA-Test, respectively. We plot the ROC curves as
the Figure 5 (b) shows. The AUC value can achieve 99.84%
and 99.93%. In Table 6, we can observe similar results as
the experiments given on CIFAR-10. When facing CW-L0 at-
tacks, the detection rate for the AEs from DM -CWL0-Test is
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Figure 5: ROC curves for different datasets.
Dataset Detector FPR CW-L0 JSMA
CIFAR-10
AEPECKER 2.0% 98.4% 99.5%
FS [47] 4.9% 98.1% 83.7%
NIC [27] 3.8% 98.0% 94.0%
MNIST
AEPECKER 0.4% 99.1% 99.3%
FS [47] 4.0% 91.1% 100%
NIC [27] 3.7% 100% 100%
Table 7: Comparison with state-of-the-art detectors in
terms of FPR and detection rate.
99.5%, and the FPR is 0.7%. When facing JSMA attacks, the
detection rate for the AEs from DM -JSMA-Test can achieve
99.7%, and the FPR is as low as 0.1%.
Comparison. We compare the proposed system with the state-
of-the-art AE detectors, including feature squeezing [47]
and NIC [27]; both of them show that their systems are
able to effectively detect L0 AEs. Moreover, feature squeez-
ing [47] uses multiple feature squeezers, and we only com-
pare our system with the best results of their work. To
this end, we train two comprehensive models for color im-
ages and gray images, respectively. Specifically, for color im-
ages, we train the detector using both DC-CWL0-Train and
DC-JSMA-Train. For gray images, we train another detector
using DM -CWL0-Train and DM -JSMA-Train. We summa-
rize the adversarial detection rate and FPR in Table 7. For
CIFAR-10, the detection rate of feature squeezing [47] on
CW-L0 and JSMA attacks is 98.1% and 83.7%, respectively,
and its FPR—the percentage of the benign images among all
the testing benign images that is misclassified as positive—is
4.9%. NIC [27] can achieve the detection rate of 98.0% and
94.0% on CW-L0 and JSMA attacks respectively, and its FPR
is 3.8%. Our AEPECKER outperforms theirs—we can achieve
the detection rate of 98.4% and 99.5% for the two types of
L0 attacks and our FPR is only 2.0%. With repect to MNIST,
the detection rate of our model is comparable with feature
squeezing [47] and NIC [27]. Moreover, AEPECKER achieves
the lowest FPR for both CIFAR-10 and MNIST. Therefore,
our proposed detector outperforms the two state-of-the-art
detectors.
4.4.2 Transferability
This experiment is to evaluate the transferability of our system:
whether our system trained on one type of L0 AEs can be
directly applied to detect another type of L0 AEs that have
not been seen during training without any adaptation. To
this end, we train our system using DC-JSMA-Train and use
DC-CWL0-Test to test the detector. The result shows that the
detection rate is as high as 99.4%. Similarly, we train our
system using DC-CWL0-Train and use DC-JSMA-Test to
test the detector. The result shows that the detection rate is as
high as 98.7%.
The similar results are obtained for MNIST: if we use
DM -JSMA-Train to train the Siamese network and use
DM -CWL0-Test to test the detector, the detection rate is
96.3%; if our system is tained using DM -CWL0-Train and
tested on DM -JSMA-Test, the detection rate can achieve
95.4%.
Summary. Therefore, our system has good transferability;
our system trained on AEs generated by one L0 attack can be
directly applied to detect AEs generated by another L0 attack
without any adaptation.
4.4.3 Pre-processor Study
We next conduct an experiment to examine the impact of
the pre-processor; specifically, we would like to see what the
detection accuracy will be if a weak pre-processor is adopted.
The weak here means the manipulated AEs through such a
pre-processor still cannot be classified correctly by the target
model with a high possibility. Through this, we will show that
even with a weak pre-process, our system can still achieve
a high detection accuracy—this means that a perfect pre-
processor is unnecessary for our Siamese-based detector to
achieve a high success rate of detection.
Without loss of generality, we use color images as an ex-
ample for the following discussion. For color images such
as CIFAR-10, each channel of RGB is encoded by 8 bits. As
Figure 6 shows, we can reduce the original 8 bits to fewer
bits without influencing the image recognizability for human
eyes. Figure 6 also shows that it is very difficult to remove
those striking adversarial perturbations introduced by L0 at-
tacks only with such an approach. Moreover, the original L0
AEs can mislead the target neural networks to a classification
accuracy of 0%. After applying bit depth reduction, the classi-
fication accuracy for AEs in the testing datasets is calculated.
The experiment results are shown in Table 8, which suggest
that processing the AEs generated by JSMA and CW-L0 with
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Figure 6: Image examples from CIFAR-10 after applying bit
depth reduction. Given the different numbers of bit depth, the
first row displays a benign image and its processed versions;
the second row displays an AE generated by CW-L0 and its
corresponding processed images; the third row displays an AE
generated by JSMA and its corresponding processed images.
bit depth reduction cannot increase the classification accu-
racy of the target model. Therefore, the bit depth reduction
approach only has a very limited capability to defend against
L0 attacks.
We thus choose the bit depth reduction as a weak pre-
processor for color images. The experiment results show that
even when a weak pre-processor (such as bit depth reduction)
is applied, our Siamese-based detector still can achieve a very
good performance. The detection rates for AEs generated by
JSMA and CW-L0 are 99.6% and 99.4%, respectively; and
the FPR is 2.1%. Xu et al. also use bit depth reduction as a
pre-processor [47]; however, the best detection rates provided
by their system for AEs generated by JSMA and CW-L0 are
4.1% and 36.5% respectively, and its FPR is 5%.
Summary. Therefore, our proposed Siamese-based detector
outperforms the state-of-the-art method when using the same
weak pre-processor. The result also demonstrates that the
good performance of our detector does not rely on a perfect
pre-processor, but is due to the Siamese network design.
4.5 Efficiency
Training time. It is widely known that neural networks
usually require a large amount of data and time for train-
ing. However, as our sub-networks employed within the
Siamese architecture are quite simple and shallow, the train-
ing is very efficient. For example, for DM -JSMA-Train and
DC-JSMA-Train, each epoch with 20,000 images (10,000
benign images and 10,000 AEs) only takes 5 and 7 seconds,
respectively. On the other hand, due to the simple and shallow
sub-networks, with a relatively small training set, our Siamese
neural-network-based AEPECKER can still achieve high de-
tection accuracies (Section 4.4). Moreover, the training time
is linear with respect to the number of epochs and the number
Datasets Bit Depth
2-bit 3-bit 4-bit 5-bit
DC-JSMA-Test 22.2% 27.1% 21.2% 12.0%
DC-CWL0-Test 51.2% 56.6% 55.1% 51.5%
Table 8: The classification accuracy for AEs in testing datasets
after applying bit depth reduction.
of training samples for each epoch.
Our experiment results show that our system trained on
CIFAR-10 and MNIST can converge very quickly and achieve
high accuracy within 100 and 200 epochs, respectively—thus,
the training only requires around 8 minutes and 23 minutes,
respectively.
Testing time. The trained detector can detect an AE very fast.
For example, AEPECKER only takes approximately 0.5ms
on average to detect whether an image from CIFAR-10 is
adversarial or not.
5 Adaptive Attack
An adversary who knows the details of AEPECKER will try to
adapt the attacks. Thus, we seek to understand the resilience
of AEPECKER to adaptive attacks by answering the following
questions. (Q1) What is the percentage of the high-amplitude
altered pixels in AEs generated using non-adaptive L0 attacks?
Exploration of this question not only helps us understand L0
attacks and why the proposed detection and defense tech-
niques work well, but also guides the adversary to adapt L0
attacks. (Q2) How difficult is it for an adversary to adaptively
generate L0 AEs that bypass our detection?
To answer these questions, we launch an adaptive L0 at-
tack by adopting a similar method described in [17], which
has successfully demonstrated a capability to impede feature
squeezing [47]. Our implementation is based on the source
code given by [8]. To generate L0 AEs, after each step of
stochastic gradient descent (SGD), an intermediate distorted
image is generated as a resolution of the optimizer. Each time
the optimizer runs, the process tries to minimizes the num-
ber of altered pixels and, in the meanwhile, keep the targeted
attack successful.
Answer to Q1. Let NA be the number of altered pixels and
NE the number of such altered pixels that possess extreme val-
ues (i.e., values smaller than α or larger than β). We consider
the ratio ρ= NE/NA as an indicator showing the percentage
of pixels with large-amplitude perturbations, and want to un-
derstand how this ratio changes in the AE generation process.
As an empirical analysis, we carry out SGD step by step on
100 randomly selected images from CIFAR-10. For each of
the last 10 steps, we calculate an average ratio ρ¯ value of the
100 intermediate images, as shown in Figure 7. We observe
that the average ratio ρ¯ goes higher and higher as NA de-
creases. Finally, when the optimal resolution is found, around
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Figure 7: L0 attacks are launched on 100 randomly selected
images from CIFAR-10. For each of the last 10 optimization
steps, we examine the average ratio ρ¯ of the 100 intermediate
distorted images.
90% of the altered pixels by average possess extreme values.
This helps understand why the proposed technique works
well, since it is designed to deal with such large-amplitude
perturbations by recovering these pixels.
An adversary who is aware of the details of the proposed
technique thus should try to control the amplitude of those
altered pixels while satisfying the L0 optimization target (i.e.,
minimizing NA ). Thus, given an image, we run the SGD
multiple times; once the value of ρ is over 80% (note this
value finally can reach 90% by average), we explore different
optimization paths. The result shows that only 5% of the
cases succeed to control the ratio ρ under 80%. Therefore, it
is difficult to control the amplitude of the altered pixels while
satisfying the L0 optimization target.
Answer to Q2. We follow the procedures described in [17]
to adaptively search potential L0 AEs. Our design of the adap-
tive L0 attack is as follows. Since inpainting is used in both
detection and defense, the adversary integrates it into the AE
generation; during the AE generation, the intermediate im-
age at each step of the optimization procedure is processed
using our inpainting pre-processor. Next, we check whether
the resulting image is a successful attack. If that it cannot
successfully fool the neural network, we iteratively run SGD
multiple times (10 in our experiments) until a resolution is
found. We randomly select 100 color images from CIFAR-10,
Our experiments show that the final number of altered pixels
only takes up less than 2% of the total number of the pixels in
images from CIFAR-10, which means that they achieve the
L0 optimization target. The result finally shows that only 7%
of cases can generate successful AEs to evade our detection.
In contrast, [17] shows that adaptive attacks using a similar
method can bypass feature squeezing [47] at 100%. Therefore,
our method is much more resilient than prior work.
Summary. Based on these explorations, we conclude that
L0 attacks have an inherent limitation, and it is difficult for
adaptive attacks to overcome the limitation to bypass our
detection.
6 Related Work
Generally, the protection strategies against AE attacks fall
into two groups, i.e., detection and defense. In this section,
we will briefly review them both.
6.1 Detecting Adversarial Examples
An AE detector is a binary classifier which is designed to
distinguish an adversarial sample from a legitimate one. There
are two strategies which are often used to design AE detectors,
i.e., adversarial training and predication mismatch.
6.1.1 Detector Training
Some techniques use both AEs and legitimate images to train
a detector. For example, Li et al. [23] extract PCA features
after inner convolutional layers of the neural network, then use
a cascade classifier to detect AEs. Metzen et al. [31] use both
adversarial and benign samples to train a CNN-based auxiliary
network. This light-weight sub-network works with the target
model to detect AEs. They usually require a large number of
samples to train the model while we only need a relatively
small dataset. More importantly, our detector achieves a high
detection rate but low FPR for handling L0 AEs.
6.1.2 Prediction Mismatch
Some techniques use the prediction mismatch strategy. For
example, Bagnall et al. [3] train an ensemble of multiple mod-
els to use a rank voting mechanism to combine those outputs.
In this way, an ensemble disagreement can be used to detect
adversarial examples. Bi-model [32] firstly employs two pre-
trained distinct models to generate features, then feeds the
concatenated features to an additional binary classifier.
Other works [24, 30, 43, 47] apply pre-processors on an in-
put image. For example, Meng et al. [30] train an auto-encoder
as the image filter. Tian et al. [43] pre-process the images with
randomly rotation and shifting since adversarial examples are
usually sensitive to such transformation operations. Liang
et al. [24] implement an adaptive denoiser based on image
entropy as the filter. Their methods then feed the original
image and the processed one to the same neural network–if
the predictions of the two images fail to match, the input is
adversarial. In addition, Xu et al. [47] propose feature squeez-
ing to detect AEs by comparing the prediction on original
inputs with that on the squeezed ones. However, the proposed
detector outperforms feature squeezing for handling L0 at-
tacks. Note that the performance of their approach heavily
relies on the effectiveness of the feature squeezing methods.
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On the contrary, our Siamese-based detector does not rely on
powerful pre-processing (see Section 4.4.3).
Our detection technique seems close to the approaches in
the second category but is actually very different. Rather than
using a simple mismatch or a distance value to describe the
discrepancy between an AE and its manipulated image, our
technique uses a Siamese network to automatically extract
the discrepancy between the two as features for detection.
6.2 Defense
The primary task of defensive techniques is to alleviate or
eliminate the influences of AEs. In general, the current de-
fensive techniques can be grouped into two major categories,
that is, model enhancement and input transformation.
6.2.1 Model Enhancement
The first category improves the resilience of neural networks
by including AEs in the process of model training, i.e., ad-
versarial training [13, 28]. However, this type of defense is
usually less effective against black-box attacks than white-box
attacks considering the training only focuses on one certain
neural network. Also, Xu et al. claim that this kind of tech-
nique suffers high cost because of iterative re-training with
both adversarial and normal examples [47]. Alternatively, de-
fensive distillation is proposed, and can obstruct the neural
networks from fitting too tightly to the data [35]. However,
the prior work [8] demonstrates that the approach can be
easily circumvented with a minimal modified attack such as
a CW-L0. Shield [11] enhances a model by re-training it
with multiple levels of compressed images based upon JPEG.
However, this method is still ineffective against L0 attacks.
6.2.2 Input Transformation
For the second category of defenses, researchers have averted
their eyes from neural networks to the adversarial inputs them-
selves. In short, pre-processing the inputs before feeding them
to networks is helpful for increasing the prediction accuracy
even when facing adversarial examples. The reason why ad-
versarial examples could successfully fool the deep learning
model without being perceived is that attackers take advan-
tage of the information redundancy of images to add adver-
sarial noise. Consequently, well designed filters or denoisers
can be considered a cure for adversarial images by removing
unwanted noise. For instance, Liao et al. [25] propose higher-
level guided denoisers to remove the adversarial noise from
inputs; however, their approach is computationally expensive
and their work does not show its effectiveness on L0 attacks.
Some other methods adopt compression techniques, such as
PCA [4] and JPEG [10, 12, 14, 37], to filter out the infor-
mation redundancy which may provide living space for ad-
versarial perturbations in images; however, these approaches
are not suitable for L0 attacks. Furthermore, Bafna et al. [2]
independently propose a defense against L0 attacks; but their
Fourier-transform-based approach is not as effective as ours
(see Section 4.3).
There exist some approaches that do not fall in either cate-
gory. For example, MVP-Ears [48] borrows the idea of multi-
version programming from software engineering and applies
it to audio AE detection. It deploys multiple diverse automatic
speech recognition systems in parallel, and detects audio AEs
by comparing their recognition results. However, the idea will
probably fail in handling image AEs, which are known to
have good transferability [13].
7 Discussion
First, the proposed technique is not a panacea for detecting or
defending against all possible attacks. As future work, we are
to explore whether the Siamese network-based detector can
be generalized to detect other types of attack, such as L∞.
Second, our adaptive attack (following the procedures
in [17]) is based on the exploration of different optimization
paths. There exist some other alternative white-box attacks,
such as the method proposed in [7] which attempts to create
new AEs by modifying the loss functions to bypass detectors.
Whether other different adaptive attacks, such as [7], can by-
pass our detector is interesting, and we plan to investigate it
in the future.
Third, how to prevent the over-fitting problem is still an
open question in the field of machine learning. Although
we took over-fitting into consideration when designing the
experiments (e.g., the testing dataset and training dataset are
completely disjoint), the over-fitting problem is still possible.
Specifically, our evaluation only examined base classifiers
ResNet and CNN. Future work will consider other classifiers
with different architectures.
Fourth, we are also interested in whether the proposed tech-
nique is scalable to handle a larger data set such as ImageNet.
We leave this evaluation as the future work.
Lastly, this work shows that only controlling the number of
altered pixels without limiting the resulting amplitude weak-
ens the power of the generated AEs. Thus, how to make a
good trade-off between the number of altered pixels and their
amplitude becomes critical when designing new AE genera-
tion algorithms.
8 Conclusions
In the setting of classic L0 AE attacks, a bounded number of
pixels can be corrupted without limiting the amplitude. These
large-amplitude pertubations in L0 AEs are considered as a
challenge by many previous works, since the effect of such
corruptions is difficult to eliminate. Considering the threats
caused by L0 AEs, a highly accurate detection technique and
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an effective defense that can rectify the classification under
L0 perturbations are urgently needed. By identifying and ex-
ploiting the inherent characteristics of L0 AEs, we develop
AEPECKER that thwarts this type of attacks. Its novel Siamese
network based design shows very high accuracies in detecting
L0 AEs, and its inpainting-based preprocessing technique can
effectively rectify those AEs and thus correct the classifica-
tion results. Plus, it is resilient to adaptive attacks that bypass
prior approaches.
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